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Highlights
On 16-17 March 2012, at the European University Institute, current 
and former judges from the Court of Justice of the European Union, 
the Inter-African Court of Human Rights, the Constitutional or Su-
preme Courts of Brasil, Ireland, Israel, Italy and Nigeria met leading 
academics in the field of judicial politics, legal theory and interna-
tional law and debated over issues related to Courts, Social Changes 
and Judicial Independence. Taking due account of the diversity of 
courts’ situation across legal domains, geographical scope and levels 
of government involved, the GGP High Level Policy Seminar (HLPS) 
addressed the same questionnaire to domestic, regional and inter-
national courts, examining in a first panel Civil Society and Social 
Change through Courts at the Domestic, Regional and International 
Level and, in a second one, Representativeness and Independence in 
Courts2. On the basis of the themes introduced by the academics and 
in light of the lively debate developed around them, this Policy Brief 
suggests new conceptual and empirical perspectives on which a new 
set of concrete proposals could be built in order to articulate courts, 
judicial independence and societal change.
1 Cristina Dallara (cristina.dallara@eui.eu) is Jean Monnet fellow within the Global 
Governance Programme at the Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies and Re-
searcher at the Italian National Research Council, Research Institute on Judicial Studies 
in Bologna; Antoine Vauchez (antoine.vauchez@univ-paris1.fr) is Research Professor at 
the Centre européen de sociologie et science politique (Centre National de la Recherche 
Scientifique / Univ. Paris 1-Sorbonne).
2  This Policy brief takes into account the discussions that took place during the HLPS but 
is by no means meant to be a summary of these.   
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BACKGROUND
Often viewed as self-contained and insulated sys-
tems, constitutional, international and regional 
courts do however face similar challenges. Organ-
ised within the Research Strand on “Modes of Glob-
al Governance”, and in line with the research project 
“The Disputed Field of Global Justice. A Transna-
tional Inquiry”, the HLPS aimed at engaging a dis-
cussion of their specificities and commonalities as 
actors of social change. Without necessarily speak-
ing of judicialisation of politics, it is unquestionable 
that in many contemporary democracies the role of 
the courts made a drift away from the stato-centric 
conceptions of courts as a formal component of the 
bureaucratic apparatus. In more concrete terms, this 
phenomenon seems to have a twofold nature: judi-
cial actors are increasingly involved in the public 
discourse and citizens are increasingly asking judg-
es to perform direct role in societal debates, from 
citizens’ rights to market regulation or environment 
protection. To put it differently, courts (whether do-
mestic or international) are not anymore judging in 
front of a semi-secretive and socially homogeneous 
audience. They are increasingly embedded in the 
society and their decisions are persistently gaining 
relevance in the general public debate, as well as 
in the policy making. Even international courts, at 
long defined within a Westphalian conception of in-
ternational politics, have now become integral part 
of a mode of governance that connects transnation-
al mobilizations, supranational/national litigation 
and rule change. Such attractiveness of international 
courts may be related to the partial failure of the re-
lated parent bodies such as the WTO or the Council 
of Europe to address the issues for which they had 
been created. It may also, in the case of constitu-
tional courts, be a way through which the political 
actors pass to courts “hot-questions” that they are 
unable or unwilling to settle on political grounds. 
All in all, even though the recourse to justice may 
turn to be a risky strategy for social movements, the 
judicial avenue has often become a surrogate for 
democratic participation, in particular for minor-
ity groups structurally marginalised in the political 
field. 
It must be clear however that such increasing re-
course to courts triggers a dynamic with many side-
effects and unintended consequences. Case-law is 
path-driven and may therefore later on constrains 
social change as it is the case in the EU where human 
rights are often better defended on the ground of the 
“four freedoms” of circulation than through human 
rights’ clauses themselves. The increasing saliency 
of courts often comes along with wider changes in 
modes of regulation from state-centred politics to 
more rights-based regulation, as it has been ob-
served in the emergence of a European variant of US 
adversarial legalism. Last but not least, such social 
exposure may backlash as courts come to be identi-
fied as policy-oriented actors with a more or less hid-
den agenda and offering little chance of override. As 
a result of this common positioning at the interface 
between law and politics, and their more frequent 
engaging into law-making, both constitutional and 
international courts face increasing political and le-
gal critique, thereby evidencing the precariousness 
of their institutional and political set-up.
To what extent does litigation allow for (or con-
strain) participation and social inclusion? How 
does legal standing impact constitutional and in-
ternational courts? How do they concretely deal 
with controversial issues and ‘hard cases’ ? Does the 
claim for representativeness (in terms of gender, mi-
nority, class, etc) contradict the equally central re-
quirement of judicial independence? How do courts 
include diversity and plurality in their proceedings? 
On all these points, the High-Level Policy Seminar 
brought cutting-edge inter-disciplinary research 
and new empirics in dialogue with the experience of 
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high-profile judges from Africa, North- and South-
America as well as Europe. Freely drawing from 
the debate that took place, the Policy Brief does not 
wish to suggest a particular line of policy reform, 
nor a form of consensus. In line with the Seminar’s 
purpose, this brief essentially aims at clarifying, 
both conceptually and empirically, a number of cru-
cial debates, key alternatives and a potential arsenal 
of solutions.
KEY ISSUES
Access to justice (1): Legal standing
In a context in which international and constitu-
tional courts have become a powerful channel for 
the civil society participation in policy processes, it 
does not come as a surprise that courts –in particular 
international courts- register a growing pressure for 
further opening of legal standing. Judges themselves 
agree that it is fundamental to give people the hope 
to be heard in courts. It is safe to assume nowadays 
that the more the courts are open and easily reacha-
ble, the more they will be perceived as legitimated to 
deal with relevant social issues. Some even consider 
the issue of “legal standing” as the defining element 
of a court’s posture vis-à-vis social change: “tell me 
your position on legal standing and I will tell you 
what kind of court you are”, could well be a univer-
sal motto for courts. There are indeed many ways 
to deal with these amounting social expectations. 
In the case of the International Criminal Court, for 
example, the participation of victims, heard by the 
Court as witnesses, has dramatically changed the 
dynamics of the proceedings. In WTO dispute pan-
els, civil society actors are allowed to participate as 
amicus curiae. At the European Court of Human 
Rights, civil society actors are considered fully par-
ties of the dispute and partially at the Inter-African 
one as well. In countries like India, Israel and South 
Africa, for example, there is an open standing in the 
domain of human rights before constitutional and 
supreme courts. On the whole, even if civil society 
participation still varies depending on the type of 
court (the more state-oriented the court is, the less 
involvement of civil society groups), there is a gen-
eral - albeit diversified - trend of opening the judi-
cial arena to societal groups and individuals. These 
various openings to non-state actors have enabled a 
new range of societal issues, such as human rights, 
environment or trade, to come to the forefront. 
While crucial for the court’s legitimacy, access to jus-
tice is also a source of problems and constrains. An 
increasing caseload may impinge upon equally criti-
cal objectives for courts, such as the quality of ju-
dicial decision-making process or the effectiveness 
of the court (delays in judging). All constitutional 
and international courts therefore face the delicate 
task to strike a balance between opening completely 
the doors and introducing filters. It is certainly not 
possible to establish standards and best-practices 
that would be appropriate for all courts worldwide 
(one-size-fits-all) since much depends on the type 
and the amount of cases each court deals with and 
on the system in which courts perform their duties. 
Yet, a comparative outlook indicates a limited set of 
techniques of filtering that range from certiorari rul-
ings to reforming the constitutive convention, be it a 
Constitution or a treaty.
Access to courts (2): non-legal barriers 
Access to justice cannot however be limited to the 
issue of legal standing. There is a wide range of so-
cial and cultural factors that impede or deter spe-
cific individuals and groups (financially disadvan-
taged and/or culturally insulated/marginalized) 
to have recourse to judicial institutions. In some 
countries, for instance in Africa, civil society is still 
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completely unorganized and thus NGOs are hardly 
able to participate to and to access courts. In this 
context, ensuring the physical presence of the par-
ties at the Court can already be an issue. The issue 
here is about ensuring an effective access to courts 
through free justice and legal assistance, as a major-
ity of citizens could certainly not pay the costs of a 
judicial proceeding. 
Two essential debates need to be raised regardingly. 
First of all, should it be the objective to bring dis-
advantaged people and/or historically marginalized 
groups into the judicial system, or should we not 
use alternative modes of conflict resolution such 
as “indigenous courts”, in the countries in which 
they are present, or alternative dispute resolutions 
(ADR) systems? But what if this customary law 
and its related informality were consolidating pat-
terns of exclusion (in terms of race, class, gender), 
while at the same time were raising concerns over 
the transparency of law? The objective might well 
then be instead to bring the ‘luxury’ of formality 
and full-fledged judicial guarantees to all (including 
access to specialized and high-quality lawyers for 
low-income individuals). Second: should ‘access to 
justice’ policies rely on State-based free access to le-
gal aid (which may prove more difficult in a context 
of budgetary constraints), or could we take the risk 
to have recourse to a privately-led system based for 
example on a more diffused pro-bono practice, or 
even “conditional fees” (“no-win, no-fee” arrange-
ments) with the important side-effect of multiplying 
nuisance claims? 
Dealing with societal change 
The flipside of such social exposure is the increasing 
criticisms courts are facing in the public sphere as 
they are pointed as responsible for all sorts of soci-
etal or political blockages. The 2011 reform of the 
Hungarian Constitution indicates that processes of 
judicialisation can always backlash into harsh con-
flicts between the government and the judicial body. 
The on-going ‘revolution’ in Hungary is indeed by 
many standards a limit-case that recalls the rich in-
stitutional arsenal through which political majori-
ties can attempt to control or undermine judicial 
independence: court-packing, judicial appoint-
ment, case assignment, forced judges’ retirement, 
limitation of the court’s domain of competence, de-
constitutionalization of its statute, etc. Of course, 
each of these reforms could be differently problem-
atic on ideosyncrasies of one given country or of a 
given court: in most States, constitutional and in-
ternational courts are in part appointed by political 
bodies without necessarily raising doubts in terms 
of institutional independence. All these elements 
however converge in pointing at the precariousness 
of courts’ legitimacy: the frequent insulation of the 
judicial bodies in front of campaigns of criticisms is 
a further evidence in this regard.
Given their fragile legitimacy, how do international 
and constitutional courts cope with the many hard 
cases that are sent to them? In which measure are 
they concerned by the social effects of their judg-
ing and how do they integrate them in their work? 
The increasing saliency of courts’ decisions calls for 
a certain degree of cautious and self-restraint. Del-
egation, it should be recalled, implies a number of 
“fiduciary duties” including the courts’ loyalty to the 
original convention’s values and stakeholders (be it a 
Constitution or a treaty). Among the possible devic-
es for such cautiousness, one can cite the avoidance 
of ultra vires decisions, the usage of “margins of ap-
preciation”, the assessment of “consensual” practices 
among member-states, or even forms of “majoritar-
ian activism” that take into account widely shared 
societal values, etc. Securing courts’ legitimacy may 
also imply to make the activity of judges and courts 
more visible and understandable for citizens. The 
practice of public and open hearings is, in this re-
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spect, increasing in many countries. An interesting 
example on this aspect is offered by the Supreme 
Court of Brasil that maintains a television channel 
called TV Justiça where live or pre-recorded ses-
sions of the Supreme Court can be watched. The 
unintended effects (agonistic behaviours, backdoor 
agreements, etc.) of such communications strategies 
should however always be kept in mind.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
From courts’ reflectiveness to courts’ reflexiveness
Willy, nilly, courts are nowadays most often viewed 
in the public eye as “representative institutions”, 
certainly different from legislature but equally ex-
pected to timely address societal hard cases. As 
they raise strong social and political expectations, it 
comes as no surprise that courts be scrutinized for 
the ‘agenda’ they might be pursuing and the possi-
ble gender-, minority-, class- biases that may appear 
in both their judging and their composition. This 
points at the ways “representativeness” and “judicial 
independence” relate to each other both conceptu-
ally and empirically. Is there necessarily a trade-off 
between the two objectives or can one find ways of 
balancing and securing both? No serious answer to 
these questions can be given unless one does unpack 
these two critical notions of “judicial independence” 
and “representativeness” as they bear a large variety 
of meanings. 
Opening the blackbox of courts’ 
representativeness
Recent legal theory tells us that representativeness 
can be “volitional” (related to democratic delega-
tion), “identitarian” (related to the inclusion of spe-
cific groups and minorities), “argumentative” (relat-
ed to the deliberation and writing style of the court) 
or “vicarious” (related to the easiness of political 
override). It should certainly be pointed out that 
these four meanings can hardly be differentiated in 
practice as they do most often overlap. Still, such ty-
pology is helpful when thinking about the possible 
control levers that could be used to address the is-
sue of courts’ representativeness. For instance, the 
appointment procedure (of both judges and clerks), 
the type of judicial tenure (short or long, renewable 
or not), the forms of the hearings (public or not), 
are elements that could impact on the “volitional 
representativeness” of courts. The design of judicial 
institutions can also have an impact on the degree 
of “argumentative representativeness”: some types 
of judicial writing or interpretative methodologies 
(less literal readings of legal texts), some forms of 
judicial deliberation (e.g. ‘dissenting’ or ‘concurring’ 
opinions) are certainly more favourable when it 
comes to addressing public debates’ arguments. Yet, 
the desirability of one solution or another heavily 
depends on the particular social and political con-
sensus underpinning each one of these courts. It 
seems quite unlikely that EU Member States would 
agree to open “dissenting opinions” in Luxembourg, 
although such blockade is somehow being compen-
sated nowadays by an increasing role of the advo-
cate general in peddling new ideas. Other institu-
tional devices could address the issue of identitarian 
representation of courts, a legitimacy requirement 
that assumes that judges should be representing 
those whom their decisions are addressed to. Here 
the focus is more on race, gender, religion and eth-
nicity traits, assuming that public thrust in the jus-
tice system increases if the value of diversity, in all 
its elements, is included in courts. Against the usual 
criticisms of such opening to diversity, it should be 
said that identitarian representativeness does not 
imply the ‘representation’ of any sort of difference 
but, more narrowly, of “historically-rooted patterns 
of exclusion” of specific sub-groups (women, post-
colonial communities, etc.). Yet, it would be highly 
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misleading to believe that a higher degree of social 
and cultural ‘reflectiveness’ would necessarily bring 
about profound changes in the course of jurispru-
dence. After all, some of the European Court of Jus-
tice’s (ECJ) most critical turns in sex discrimination 
case-law have been accomplished by an exclusively-
male court.
Unpacking judicial independence
Such paradox calls for further thinking on the no-
tion of “judicial independence”, hereafter under-
stood as regarding not so much the independence 
of the court, but that of the judge. Most scholars and 
judges would agree today that judges’ absolute im-
partiality and neutrality to values appears in large 
part like a myth (although, as such, it may have 
strong effects in reality). Even without accepting 
political scientists’ views of judges as strategic and 
policy-oriented actors, it is widely acknowledged 
that judges are, as any social actor, deeply rooted in 
one particular society. Their personal life experience 
is a powerful roadmap when it comes to embodying 
one particular judicial role or making sense of the 
contexts in which cases are embedded. Each judge’s 
personal habitus becomes a critical element of the 
courts’ openness to alternative views, silenced voices 
and differently reasonable explanations. Rather than 
a threat to judicial independence, this openness to 
un-common sense could be viewed as reinforcing 
the quality of judicial deliberation, the independ-
ence of the judiciary vis-à-vis political majorities or 
socially dominant groups, as well as a source of le-
gitimacy for courts. Rather than an unrealistic ideal 
type of neutrality, such “soft-partiality” would cer-
tainly ease courts’ interaction with our fast-paced 
changing societies. This however implies that judges 
act as both lawyers and “anthropologists” imply-
ing that professional self-awareness and reflexivity 
should be valued as critical qualities within the ju-
dicial profession. 
The challenge for the legal community
All these elements eventually point at the partic-
ularly-heavy challenge that national and transna-
tional legal communities –from law faculties to 
bars- now need to face. In effect, these are not only 
the breeding group from which judges are selected, 
but also the particular social milieu in which liti-
gants –that is those who are the critical carriers of 
new ideas into the judicial system- are trained and 
socialised. As such, legal communities are the inter-
face between societal change and courts: their role 
as both drivers and filters of change underlines the 
critical functions played by legal education and legal 
scholarship, in particular in bringing diversity and 
reflectiveness at the core of law schools’ curriculum. 
This in turn calls for a more comprehensive and in-
ter-disciplinary understanding of courts on the part 
of scholars, taking into full account the historical-
ly-rooted and socially-grounded trajectory of legal 
ideas and judicial institutions. 
International judges and top academics at the High-Level Policy Seminar “Courts, Social Change and Judicial Independence” 
16-17 March 2012, EUI
